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 Abstract 
A wide variety of insurance products is available to agricultural producers to insure 
against yield or price risks in the markets for the raw commodities they produce. Value-
added enterprises, such as ethanol production, have been expanding over the last decade. 
This paper outlines the development of an insurance product aimed at corn producers 
who are members of an ethanol production cooperative. The product has the potential to 
provide these producers with a new and useful risk management tool to insure against 
price risks in the markets for corn, distillers dried grains with solubles (DDGS), ethanol, 
and natural gas. Monte Carlo analysis is used to develop fair premiums at various 
coverage levels. A historical correlation structure is imposed on the simulated price data 
using a method proposed by Iman and Conover (1982), which maintains the marginal 
distributions of the variables. Historical analysis is carried out to examine how the 
product would have performed had it been offered over the last decade. The product is 
shown to perform as intended, paying indemnities in years of extreme price volatility.  
 
Keywords:  correlations, ethanol, insurance, risk management, value-added agriculture.
  
 
 
 
INSURING UNCERTAINTY IN VALUE-ADDED AGRICULTURE: 
ETHANOL PRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Value-added enterprises, such as ethanol production, have recently gained interest as 
tools farmers can use to create new markets for their products. According to the Renewable 
Fuels Association (2004), there are more than 80 ethanol production facilities operating, 
expanding, or under construction in the United States. These facilities comprise a total 
production capacity of more than 3.6 billion gallons annually in the United States, up more 
than 40 percent from the capacity in 2001. In 2004, the national ethanol industry will 
consume 1.35 billion bushels of corn, or 13 percent of expected 2004 corn production. 
The majority of ethanol plants use corn as the feedstock in the production process, 
creating new markets for corn producers. Many of these production facilities are set up as 
cooperatives, in which producers are required to provide an initial investment to become 
a member of the cooperative and then receive premium payments based on plant 
profitability, in addition to the payments they receive for the grain they market to the 
facility. In most cases, membership “shares” are sold on a per bushel basis with a 
designated delivery requirement and with premium payments made based on each 
producer’s proportion of total bushels processed. 
The vast majority of crop and revenue insurance policies sold in the United States 
are single-crop policies that insure against low yields or revenues for each crop grown on 
the farm. These policies insure the commodity based on its value in its raw form. But, 
increasingly, producer income is based more on the value of crops that have been 
converted into a value-added product. Insurance against declines in the value-added 
portion of the crop is not yet available.  
This paper develops a risk management tool for corn producers who are involved in 
ethanol production to insure against poor financial performance of the facility. By 
insuring against circumstances that cause low profits for ethanol plants, the product 
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would provide value to its owner during periods of low premium payments from ethanol 
plants. The product mimics the gross margin level of a typical ethanol production facility 
that implements the dry-mill production process using corn as the feedstock. The gross 
margin, premium, and indemnity levels are calculated on a per bushel basis to enable 
producers to utilize the product based on how many bushels of corn they intend to market 
to the ethanol facility over the contract year.  
 
The Ethanol Production Process 
The dry-mill process of producing ethanol using corn as a feedstock has reached a 
technological equilibrium in that the input-output ratio is a fixed relationship. According 
to the Iowa Value Added Resource Manual (Bryan and Bryan, Inc. 2000) and discussions 
with staff at the Iowa Renewable Fuels Association, the dry-mill process converts corn 
into ethanol according to the following input-output relationship: 
Inputs: 1.0 bushel (bu) of corn 
 0.165 million British thermal units (mmBtu) of natural gas 
Outputs: 2.7 gallons of ethanol 
 17 pounds of distillers dried grains with solubles (DDGS) 
The insurance product is structured under these fixed technological assumptions and 
is aimed at agricultural producers who are members of an ethanol production cooperative. 
These cooperatives typically pay per bushel premiums on a quarterly or annual basis to 
their members, based on the performance and profitability of the cooperative. Therefore, 
this product mimics the level of gross margin an ethanol plant would achieve, which 
should be an adequate measure of the level of premiums paid out to the members. While 
the input-output ratio is fixed across operations, fixed and overhead cost structures will 
differ among ethanol plants. Therefore, the gross margin is insured rather than the net 
margin of an ethanol production facility. 
 
Contract Details 
This insurance product is an Asian Basket Option, where the payout at maturity will 
equal the difference (if positive) between the value of an asset portfolio and a set strike 
value. Hart, Babcock, and Hayes (2001) used similar methods in developing various 
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types of livestock revenue insurance products for cattle and hog producers. The contract 
insures the average annual gross margin of an ethanol production facility per bushel of 
corn processed. The contract is structured on an annual basis running from April through 
March to align insurance sales with the sales closing date for corn crop insurance policies 
sold in the Corn Belt. At sign-up, producers would need to provide information on the 
total number of bushels that will be marketed (or the ownership share in the facility 
expressed in bushels) to the ethanol facility during the contract year.  
This product insures against price risks in two energy markets, ethanol and natural 
gas, and one raw agricultural commodity market, corn. The majority of the ethanol 
cooperatives have annual delivery requirements for each member based on their 
proportion of ownership in the facility. The construction of this insurance product is as an 
“add-on” product to existing crop insurance products. Only producers who are eligible to 
insure corn under a crop or revenue product would be eligible to purchase the product; 
therefore, production risk is not considered in the development of this product.  
Projected commodity price levels and the fixed proportions of technology determine 
the guaranteed level of gross margin according to the following formula: 
 
12 12 12 12
1 1 1 1
1 2.7* 0.0085* 0.165*
12 t t t tt t t t
MarGuar ETHP DDGP CORNP NGP
= = = =
 = ∗ + − −  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (1) 
where MarGuar is the guaranteed level of average gross margin ($/bushel), ETHPt is the 
projected ethanol price in month t ($/gallon), DDGPt  is the projected DDGS price in 
month t ($/ton), CORNPt  is the projected corn price in month t ($/bushel), and NGPt is 
the projected natural gas price in month t ($/mmBtu). 
 
Price Projections 
Projecting corn and natural gas prices can be accomplished directly using the futures 
markets for these commodities. However, there are currently no futures markets for 
ethanol or DDGS prices. Therefore, pricing proxies are developed for these two 
commodities in order to formulate the product. 
DDGS is a type of feed ration additive used mainly in the dairy and poultry 
industries. Corn and soybean meal are two main substitutes for DDGS as a ration in 
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livestock feed. Both corn and soybean meal are traded on futures markets. Using a 
monthly average DDGS price data series from Lawrenceburgh, Indiana (1994-2002),1 
and average futures settlement prices for corn and soybean meal over the same period, 
the simple correlations between DDGS, corn, and soybean meal are calculated. The 
correlation between DDGS and corn prices is 0.775. The correlation between DDGS and 
soybean meal prices is 0.700. Because corn and DDGS exhibit a higher correlation, corn 
is used to develop a price proxy for DDGS. The data series for DDGS and corn prices are 
shown in Figure 1. The DDGS price data are regressed against the corn futures data using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the following model:  
 ttt CORNPDDGP εβα ++= *   (2) 
where DDGPt is the DDGS price in month t ($/ton), CORNPt is the corn price in month t 
($/bushel), and tε  is a zero-mean, homoskedastic error term. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Monthly averages of distillers dried grains with solubles (DDGS) and 
corn (CBOT) futures prices, 1994-2002 
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Ethanol is used mainly as a fuel additive in unleaded gasoline to improve emissions 
and reduce dependence on nonrenewable fossil fuels. There is a fairly strong relationship 
between ethanol and unleaded gasoline prices. The simple correlation between unleaded 
gasoline and ethanol is 0.64. This correlation is calculated using an average monthly 
price series of ethanol rack prices from Omaha, Nebraska (Nebraska Ethanol Board 
2004), and unleaded gasoline futures settlement prices averaged over the settlement 
month. The data series for ethanol and unleaded gasoline prices are plotted in Figure 2. 
The ethanol price series is regressed against the unleaded gasoline futures price series to 
estimate the following model: 
 ttt UNLPETHP εβα ++= *   (3) 
where ETHPt is the ethanol price in month t ($/gallon), UNLPt is the unleaded gasoline 
price in month t ($/gallon), and tε  is a zero-mean, homoskedastic error term. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Monthly average prices for ethanol and unleaded gasoline, 1985-2002 
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The coefficient estimates, standard errors, and the R2 value are reported in Table 1. 
According to Woolridge (2003), under the assumptions of the linear relationships for the 
price series and a zero-mean error term, the OLS regression coefficient estimates are 
unbiased (i.e., ββ =Ε ∧ ][ ). However, with the presence of serial correlation, the usual 
standard errors and t-statistics are not valid. Both regression models (equations [2] and 
[3]) are tested for first-order serial correlation. The results show strong evidence of first-
order serial correlation. Given that we are not worried about t-statistics in rating this 
product, we choose to use the unbiased parameter estimates from the standard OLS 
approach. Results from equations (2) and (3) with the price data first-differenced are 
available from the authors. 
The root mean squared errors (RMSE) are calculated for the pricing models to 
compare their predictive accuracy to that of the accuracy level in futures markets. Table 2 
reports the RMSE for each commodity. The RMSE measures for corn, unleaded gasoline, 
and natural gas reflect the accuracy of the futures markets over the historical period  
 
TABLE 1. Summary statistics for regression models (2) and (3) 
Equation 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
∧α  
(S.E.) 
∧β  
(S.E.) R2 
2 tDDGP  tCORNP  
19.52  
(7.04) 
34.00 
(2.70) 0.60 
3 tETHP  tUNLP  
0.72 
(0.04) 
0.82 
(0.07) 0.42 
Note: While the parameter estimates are unbiased, the standard errors are invalid because of serial 
correlation in the price series. 
 
 
TABLE 2. Comparisons of root mean squared errors (RMSE) across commodities 
Commodity Market RMSE 
Average Price 
Level RMSE 
  (dollars) (dollars) (percent) 
Corn Futures 0.40 2.60 15.4 
Unleaded Gasoline Futures 0.12 0.60 19.6 
Natural Gas Futures 1.17 2.53 46.4 
Ethanol Regression 0.17 1.21 14.0 
DDGS Regression 17.45 105.14 16.6 
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analyzed. The RMSE measures for ethanol and DDGS reflect the level of accuracy of 
pricing models (2) and (3). The RMSE is reported in each commodity’s typical measure 
of price per unit as well as on a percentage basis for comparison across markets. The base 
price level used in calculating the percentage-based RMSE is taken as the average over 
the predicted and actual price levels for each respective commodity. 
Table 2 shows that the levels of accuracy achieved by the pricing models are quite 
comparable to the level of accuracy exhibited in the futures markets. In fact, the 14.0 
percent and 16.6 percent levels of error calculated for the ethanol and DDGS regression 
models, respectively, are considerably lower than the level of error in the futures markets 
for unleaded gasoline and natural gas. 
Projected prices are based on futures settlement prices2 for corn from the Chicago 
Board of Trade and on unleaded gasoline and natural gas futures prices from the New 
York Mercantile Exchange. The projected prices for all commodities are taken as the 
average of the relevant futures contract settlement price over the first five trading days in 
March of the contract year. For example, the projected price for corn in December of the 
contract year is taken as the average of the futures quotes for the December corn contract 
over the first five trading days in March of the contract year. Non-contract month prices 
for corn are determined by linear interpolation between the previous and nearby contract 
months. The projected price levels for gasoline and corn are used with pricing models (2) 
and (3) to calculate price predictions for ethanol and DDGS. 
Historically, unleaded gasoline futures have not always been traded out for a full 
year when analyzing March futures quotes. In years in which futures quotes were not 
traded a full year out, the crude oil market is used to create synthetic unleaded gasoline 
predictions. Oil futures historically have been traded over a full year out, with the 
historical monthly correlation between unleaded gasoline and crude oil futures prices 
averaging 0.98. The synthetic unleaded prices are calculated by taking the percentage 
change in the predicted crude oil price from one contract month to the next and 
extrapolating that change onto the predicted price for gasoline. For example, in March 
1997, the unleaded gasoline futures market was trading out through the December 1997 
contract. The predicted price for unleaded gasoline for the January 1998 contract was 
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calculated by extrapolating the percentage change in price from the December 1997 to 
the January 1998 crude oil contract predictions. 
At the end of the contract year, the actual gross margin level is determined using 
model (1) and actual price levels throughout the contract year. Actual corn prices are 
defined as the average futures settlement price over the first 10 trading days of the 
settlement month. Actual corn prices for non-contract months are determined by linear 
interpolation between the previous and nearby contract months. Actual unleaded gasoline 
and natural gas prices are taken as the average of the futures settlement prices over the 
entire settlement month. 
At contract termination, contract owners would receive an indemnity payment for 
each bushel insured based on the following formula: 
 Indemnity = max[0, CL*MarGuar − MarAct]  (4) 
where CL is the insured coverage level and MarAct is the observed level of the ethanol 
gross margin when the actual prices are placed in equation (1). 
Since the value of this product is determined solely by futures contract prices and a 
fixed technology process, any moral hazard problem is minimized. Single producers do 
not have the ability to affect price levels and therefore cannot affect the likelihood of 
receiving payments. 
 
Premium Determination 
To determine fair premium levels, Monte Carlo simulations are used. For this 
analysis, the projected prices are taken from the first five trading days of March. The 
analysis is based on 5,000 random draws of 29 commodity prices. Each set of 5,000 
draws represents a distribution of commodity prices for a contract month. All prices are 
assumed to follow a lognormal distribution. Because the prices used in the insurance 
product are average prices, there is an issue that the sum of lognormal random variables 
is not lognormal. The sum, or average, of lognormal random variables has no closed-
form probability density function. Two analytical approximations have been employed 
in recent literature, using either a lognormal or inverse gamma distribution to represent 
the required distribution. Turnbull and Wakeman (1991), and Levy (1992) have 
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supported the use of a lognormal distribution as a good approximation. However, Levy 
(1997) showed that the lognormal approximation does not fare as well when volatilities 
increase. For this analysis, the lognormal approximation is employed for all the price 
distributions. 
The means for each price distribution are taken from the futures markets under the 
assumption that the efficient markets hypothesis holds. Implied volatilities, adjusted for 
time to maturity, are taken from at-the-money options quotes from the relevant 
commodity markets during the first week in March. As an illustration of this process, we 
use futures prices and price volatilities from March 2002. The Appendix contains a 
summary of the price distribution assumptions. 
In implementing the Monte Carlo procedure, incorporating the correlation among the 
variables is extremely important because it eliminates unrealistic price scenarios from the 
analysis. The desired correlation structure is taken from historical price data, while a 
method proposed by Iman and Conover (1982) is used to impose the historical correlation 
structure. The correlations used in the procedure are the rank correlations among the price 
variables.  The Iman and Conover method is fully transparent because the only 
manipulation to the original data is a resorting of the data. Thus, the technique preserves 
the original distributional structure of each data series while changing the relationships 
among the series.  
Historical Rank Correlations 
The rank correlation ( sr ), also know as Spearman’s rho, for a given set of paired data 
(xi, yi) is calculated by ranking the x’s and y’s from high to low (or low to high) and then 
substituting into the following formula: 
 2
1
2
)1(
*6
1),( −−=
∑
=
nn
d
yxr
n
i
i
s  (5) 
where di is the difference between the ranks assigned to xi and yi and n is the sample size. 
Historical corn futures prices from 1980 through 2002 and gasoline and natural gas 
price data from 1985 through 2002 and 1990 through 2002, respectively, were used to 
calculate the historical rank correlations. The difference between the predicted and actual 
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price levels for each commodity was calculated for each contract year, taking predicted 
and actual prices as defined in the contract details section. Rank correlations of these 
price deviates were then calculated pair-wise to maximize the amount of data available. 
The calculated historical rank correlation matrix is included in the Appendix (Table A.3).  
For the Iman and Conover method to be employed, the target matrix must be 
positive-definite, a restriction that the calculated matrix did not meet. The historical rank 
correlation matrix was modified to create a positive-definite matrix that followed the 
same historical correlation structure. The modifications performed differ by commodity. 
The intertemporal correlations for the corn price deviates are left unchanged. The 
intercommodity and intertemporal correlations between the corn, unleaded gasoline, and 
natural gas price deviates are set at their respective average values. The intertemporal 
correlations for the unleaded gasoline and natural gas price deviates are transformed 
using the following linear regression model:   
 jijiji LagRankCorr ,,, * εβα ++=  (6) 
where RankCorri,j is the intertemporal rank correlation between months i and j; Lagi,j is 
the time lag, in months, between months i and j; and ji,ε  is a zero-mean, homoskedastic 
error term for lag between months i and j. 
For example, the January and March natural gas contracts have a time lag of two 
months. The dependent variable in the estimated model would be the value of the 
calculated correlation between January and March natural gas price deviations, while the 
independent variable for that data point would equal the time lag of two months. The 
estimated slope coefficients are negative for both models, which implies that as the time 
lag between contracts gets larger, the correlation decreases, which parallels the 
correlation structure in the historical matrix. The coefficient estimates, standard errors, 
and t-statistics for both correlation models are summarized in Table 3. The coefficient 
estimates were found to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level for both models. 
The modified rank correlation matrix (T) is included in the Appendix (Table A.4). 
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TABLE 3. Summary statistics for the rank correlation regression models 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
∧α  
(S.E.) 
t-stat 
(p-value) 
∧β  
(S.E.) 
t-stat 
(p-value) 
Unleaded 
correlations 
Time lag 
(months) 
0.71 
(0.06) 
12.84 
(0.00) 
-0.052 
(0.011) 
-4.75        
(0.00) 
Natural gas 
correlations 
Time lag 
(months) 
0.82 
(0.03) 
23.96 
(0.00) 
-0.024 
(0.007) 
-3.61 
(0.00) 
 
 
Results 
Using model (1), fair premiums are determined for the 2002 contract year from 
March 2002 futures prices and using the transformed Monte Carlo draws as 5,000 
simulated actual price scenarios. Premiums and indemnities are calculated at various 
coverage levels using the DDGS and ethanol price prediction models. The projected 
gross margin for ethanol is $1.57 per bushel of corn. Table 4 summarizes the fair 
premiums at various coverage levels. 
Producers would pay only 13.5¢ per bushel for 100 percent coverage; this equates to 
a premium rate of 8.6 percent. As the level of coverage is lowered to 95 percent, the 
premium rate falls to 6.3 percent of the margin guarantee. The distribution of the 
uninsured actual gross margin values is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of gross margin scenarios when insurance is 
purchased at a coverage level of 85 percent. Roughly 35 percent of the downside risk is 
eliminated through the purchase of the insurance.  
 
TABLE 4. Premiums at various coverage levels 
Coverage Level Per Bushel Premium 
Percentage of Gross 
Margin 
(percent) ($/bushel) (percent) 
85 0.049 3.1 
90 0.071 4.5 
95 0.099 6.3 
100 0.135 8.6 
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FIGURE 3. Distribution of uninsured ethanol gross margins 
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FIGURE 4. Distribution of gross margins with 85 percent gross margin coverage 
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Historical Analysis 
Margin guarantees, actual margins, and indemnity payments are calculated from 
1991 through 2002. Historical premiums are also calculated based on the percentages of 
the margin guarantee taken from the Monte Carlo results for the 2002 contract year for 
the various coverage levels. Table 5 shows projected and actual gross margins. Table 6 
shows the calculated per bushel premiums for the insurance and outlines the indemnity 
stream that would have resulted from the insurance over the historical period. 
Indemnities would have been paid in 1993, 1994, and 1996. Corn markets were 
highly volatile in 1993, 1994, and 1996. The predicted prices for corn are well below the 
actual levels in all three years. The predictions are $0.18, $0.56, and $0.34 below the 
actual values for 1993, 1994, and 1996, respectively. The price of unleaded gasoline is 
overpredicted in 1993 ($0.08); this would also increase the value of the insurance 
product. In 1994 and 1996, unleaded gasoline prices are underpredicted by $0.02 and 
$0.12, respectively, but these effects are outweighed by the extreme volatility in the corn 
market for those years. These results confirm achievement of the objective in developing 
this product. The policy has value under conditions of extreme price volatility. 
The value of the stream of indemnity payments is less than the value of the stream of 
premium payments3 required to carry the product over the historical period analyzed.  
 
TABLE 5. Historical gross margins 
Year Projected Actual 
 ($/bushel) ($/bushel) 
1991 1.25 1.52 
1992 1.17 1.51 
1993 1.44 1.06 
1994 0.79 1.31 
1995 1.24 0.79 
1996 0.53 0.48 
1997 0.99 1.12 
1998 0.85 1.16 
1999 1.08 1.66 
2000 1.67 1.83 
2001 1.28 1.76 
2002 1.57 1.61 
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TABLE 6. Historical per bushel premiums and indemnities 
Year Premiums for Coverage at  Indemnities for Coverage at 
 85% 90% 95% 100%  85% 90% 95% 100% 
 (dollars)  (dollars) 
1991 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1992 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1993 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12  0.16 0.23 0.30 0.38 
1994 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1995 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11  0.26 0.33 0.39 0.45 
1996 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 
1997 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1998 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1999 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2000 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.14  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2001 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2002 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.14  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 0.43 0.62 0.88 1.19  0.42 0.56 0.72 0.88 
 
However, as the level of coverage decreases, the difference between the two streams of 
payments decreases. The fact that the premium stream is larger than the indemnity stream 
is an interesting result. A fair premium, by definition, should equate the payments 
received from the product to the cost of carrying the product over a period of time. It may 
be possible that the time period analyzed was simply too small, but ethanol production 
did not become a major enterprise for corn producers until the early 1990s. Therefore, 
analyzing older historical price data may not reflect true relationships.  
Another possible reason for these results is the presence of bias in the futures 
markets for the commodities used in structuring the product. The accuracy of the 
predictions for each commodity price market is analyzed for each period. On average, the 
predicted price of unleaded gasoline is $0.05 (7.38 percent) lower than the actual price 
levels used in contract settlement. The predicted prices for natural gas also exhibit a 
negative bias of $0.19 (7.68 percent). The predicted prices for corn are, on average, $0.12 
(4.69 percent) higher than the actual prices used in contract settlement. The negative and 
positive bias in the gasoline and corn markets, respectively, both cause a decrease in the 
net value (indemnity less premium) of the product. The negative bias in the natural gas 
market would increase the value of the product, but the effect of changes in natural gas 
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prices is shown to be marginally small relative to the effects of changes in corn and 
gasoline prices. It should be noted that these biases are calculated only as averages over 
the historical period analyzed. Futures market bias should be virtually eliminated by 
arbitrage, on average, if examined over a longer time interval. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
To determine the effect of price volatility on the premium rates for the product, fair 
premiums are calculated using higher levels of volatility in the Monte Carlo price draws. 
Volatilities are increased by 10 percent for each commodity price draw. Appendix Table 
A.2 reports the higher volatilities imposed on the price distributions used for premium 
determination. The premiums reported in Table 7 show that increasing the price 
volatilities by 10 percent causes the premium levels to increase by a substantial amount. 
Higher volatility implies more uncertainty, which raises the fair cost of the product. The 
higher volatility causes the premium rates to increase from 8.6 percent to 11.5 percent at 
100 percent coverage. 
At the higher levels of price volatility, the actual premium rates increase by about 39 
percent at full coverage. At 95 percent coverage, the premium rates increase by about 48 
percent. At 90 percent coverage, the premium rates increase by about 60 percent. As the 
coverage level falls to 85 percent, the premium rates increase by over 70 percent. This 
implies that premiums at all levels of coverage are extremely sensitive to the level of 
volatility assumed for the commodity prices. Premiums at lower levels of coverage are 
relatively more sensitive to the level of assumed price volatility.  
 
TABLE 7. Premiums at various coverage levels given 10 percent higher volatility 
Coverage Level Per Bushel Premium Percentage of Gross Margin 
(percent) ($/bushel) (percent) 
85 0.089 5.6 
90 0.114 7.2 
95 0.145 9.2 
100 0.181 11.5 
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Conclusions 
Currently, a wide variety of insurance products are available to agricultural 
producers to insure against yield or price risks in the markets for the raw commodities 
they produce. Over the last decade, farmers have been diversifying by becoming involved 
with value-added enterprises such as ethanol production. This research supports 
development of an insurance product aimed at corn producers who are members in an 
ethanol production cooperative. The product has the potential to provide these producers 
a new and useful risk management tool. 
The product is structured to insure against price risks in the markets for corn, DDGS, 
ethanol, and natural gas. Futures prices for corn, unleaded gasoline, and natural gas are 
used to develop a pricing model that is used to structure the product to insure the gross 
margin level of an ethanol production facility on a per bushel basis. The pricing model 
provides statistically unbiased estimators of the DDGS and ethanol prices and exhibits a 
comparable level of accuracy to the futures markets for corn, unleaded gasoline, and 
natural gas, as measured by root mean error. 
Monte Carlo analysis is used to develop fair premiums at various coverage levels. A 
historical correlation structure is imposed on the simulated price data using a method 
proposed by Iman and Conover (1982), which maintains the marginal distributions of the 
variables.  
Historical analysis is carried out to examine how the product would have performed 
had it been offered over the last decade. The product is shown to perform as intended, 
paying indemnities in years of extreme price volatility. The stream of indemnity 
payments is shown to be smaller than the stream of premium payments required to carry 
the product over the historical period analyzed. This result may come from the fact that 
the historical period analyzed is relatively small, or it may come from the bias exhibited 
in the futures markets for corn and unleaded gasoline over the historical period analyzed. 
Sensitivity analysis is also performed to determine the effect of volatility levels on the 
fair premiums. Premium rates increase as the level of price volatility is increased. This 
effect is shown to be more severe as the level of coverage decreases.  
  
Endnotes 
1. From various issues of the Feed Outlook and Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 
2. All futures price data were obtained from www.barchart.com. 
3. The indemnities and premiums are reported in nominal terms with no time 
discounting. 
 
  
References 
Bryan and Bryan, Inc. 2000. “Iowa Ethanol Plant Pre-Feasibility Study.” Iowa Value Added Resource 
Manual Web site. http://www.iowaagopportunity.org/ethanolmanual/plant.pdf (accessed March 2004). 
Hart, C.E., B.A. Babcock, and D.J. Hayes. 2001. “Livestock Revenue Insurance.” Journal of Futures 
Markets  21: 553-80. 
Iman, R.L., and W.J. Conover. 1982. “A Distribution-Free Approach to Inducing Rank Correlation among 
Input Variables.” Communication Statistics: Simulation and Computation 11: 311-34. 
Levy, E. 1997. “Asian Options.” Chapter 4 in Exotic Options: The State of the Art. Edited by L. Clewlow 
and C. Strickland. London: International Thomson Business Press. 
———. 1992. “Pricing European Average Rate Currency Options.” Journal of International Money and 
Finance 11: 474-91. 
Nebraska Ethanol Board. 2004. “Nebraska’s Unleaded Gasoline and Ethanol Average Rack Prices.” 
http://www.nol.org/home/NEO/statshtml/66.html (accessed March 2004). 
Renewable Fuels Association. 2004. “RFA - Ethanol Production Facilities.” http://www.ethanolrfa.org/ 
eth_prod_fac.html (accessed March 2004). 
Turnbull, S.M., and L.M. Wakeman. 1991. “A Quick Algorithm for Pricing European Average Options.”  
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 26: 377-89. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Feed Outlook. Various issues. Washington, DC. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Market and Trade Economics Division. Feed 
Situation and Outlook Yearbook. Various issues. Washington, DC. 
Woolridge, J.M. 2003. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. 2nd ed. Mason, OH: Thomson 
South-Western. 
 
  
Appendix 
Summary of Price Distribution Assumptions and 
Historical and Rank Correlations 
 
TABLE A.1. Price distribution assumptions and actual implied volatilities 
Distribution Assumptions  
Price  
Variable Mean 
Annualized 
Volatility 
Adjusted 
Volatilitya 
 (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Mar Corn 2.01 — — 
May Corn 2.08 17.1 7.0 
July Corn 2.15 20.0 11.5 
Sep Corn 2.22 25.2 17.8 
Dec Corn 2.30 22.3 19.3 
Mar + 1 Corn 2.39 19.7 19.7 
Jan + 1 Unl 0.64 36.7 33.5 
Feb + 1 Unl 0.65 36.7 35.1 
Mar + 1 Unl 0.65 36.7 36.7 
Apr Unl 0.73 39.6 11.4 
May Unl 0.74 41.7 17.0 
June Unl 0.74 42.3 21.1 
July Unl 0.73 40.4 23.3 
Aug Unl 0.71 39.4 25.4 
Sep Unl 0.69 38.1 26.9 
Oct Unl 0.66 36.7 28.0 
Nov Unl 0.65 36.7 29.9 
Dec Unl 0.64 36.7 31.7 
Jan + 1 NG 3.41 45.1 41.2 
Feb + 1 NG 3.35 48.3 46.3 
Mar + 1 NG 3.25 41.7 41.7 
Apr NG 2.53 48.6 14.0 
May NG 2.57 46.8 19.1 
June NG 2.63 43.5 21.7 
July NG 2.68 43.1 24.9 
Aug NG 2.73 43.5 28.1 
Sep NG 2.74 43.7 30.9 
Oct NG 2.78 43.8 33.5 
Nov NG 3.04 44.3 36.2 
Dec NG 3.30 44.8 38.8 
Note: The month abbreviation is for the futures contract month, “+ 1” indicates the month is in the next (as opposed to 
the current) year, “Unl” stands for unleaded gasoline, and “NG” stands for natural gas. 
aBased on time to maturity. 
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TABLE A.2. Price distribution assumptions and increased volatility 
Distribution Assumptions 
Price  
Variable Mean 
Annualized 
Volatility 
Adjusted 
Volatilitya 
 (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Mar Corn 2.01 — — 
May Corn 2.08 27.1 11.1 
July Corn 2.15 30.0 17.3 
Sep Corn 2.22 35.2 24.9 
Dec Corn 2.30 32.3 27.9 
Mar + 1 Corn 2.39 29.7 29.7 
Jan + 1 Unl 0.64 46.7 42.6 
Feb + 1 Unl 0.65 46.7 44.7 
Mar + 1 Unl 0.65 46.7 46.7 
Apr Unl 0.73 49.6 14.3 
May Unl 0.74 51.7 21.1 
June Unl 0.74 52.3 26.1 
July Unl 0.73 50.4 29.1 
Aug Unl 0.71 49.4 31.9 
Sep Unl 0.69 48.1 34.0 
Oct Unl 0.66 46.7 35.6 
Nov Unl 0.65 46.7 38.1 
Dec Unl 0.64 46.7 40.4 
Jan + 1 NG 3.41 55.1 50.3 
Feb + 1 NG 3.35 58.3 55.8 
Mar + 1 NG 3.25 51.7 51.7 
Apr NG 2.53 58.6 16.9 
May NG 2.57 56.8 23.2 
June NG 2.63 53.5 26.7 
July NG 2.68 53.1 30.7 
Aug NG 2.73 53.5 34.5 
Sep NG 2.74 53.7 38.0 
Oct NG 2.78 53.8 41.1 
Nov NG 3.04 54.3 44.3 
Dec NG 3.30 54.8 47.4 
Note: The month abbreviation is for the futures contract month, “+ 1” indicates the month is in the next (as 
opposed to the current) year, “Unl” stands for unleaded gasoline, and “NG” stands for natural gas. 
aBased on time to maturity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
TABLE A.3. Historical rank correlations 
 May Corn July Corn Sep Corn Dec Corn Mar+1 Corn Jan+1 Unl Feb+1 Unl Mar+1 Unl Apr Unl May Unl 
May Corn 1.000 0.580 0.328 0.322 0.334 0.358 0.536 0.364 0.195 -0.026 
July Corn 0.580 1.000 0.774 0.597 0.686 0.174 0.255 0.129 0.245 0.313 
Sep Corn  0.328 0.774 1.000 0.820 0.888 0.245 0.286 0.255 0.259 0.154 
Dec Corn 0.322 0.597 0.820 1.000 0.848 -0.150 -0.009 -0.024 0.077 -0.065 
Mar+1 Corn 0.334 0.686 0.888 0.848 1.000 0.224 0.288 0.284 0.112 -0.057 
Jan+1 Unl 0.358 0.174 0.245 -0.150 0.224 1.000 0.785 0.725 0.393 0.218 
Feb+1 Unl 0.536 0.255 0.286 -0.009 0.288 0.785 1.000 0.957 0.490 0.168 
Mar+1 Unl 0.364 0.129 0.255 -0.024 0.284 0.725 0.957 1.000 0.391 0.137 
Apr Unl 0.195 0.245 0.259 0.077 0.112 0.393 0.490 0.391 1.000 0.719 
May Unl -0.026 0.313 0.154 -0.065 -0.057 0.218 0.168 0.137 0.719 1.000 
June Unl 0.139 0.141 -0.024 -0.088 -0.135 0.298 0.222 0.243 0.457 0.773 
July Unl 0.133 -0.119 -0.154 -0.125 -0.090 0.465 0.490 0.523 0.300 0.319 
Aug Unl 0.139 -0.082 0.112 -0.123 0.129 0.678 0.657 0.686 0.424 0.152 
Sep Unl 0.238 -0.141 0.065 -0.247 0.059 0.761 0.593 0.567 0.214 -0.127 
Oct Unl 0.412 0.065 0.079 -0.156 0.011 0.779 0.606 0.490 0.364 0.096 
Nov Unl 0.321 -0.022 0.053 -0.201 0.046 0.798 0.633 0.548 0.337 0.018 
Dec Unl 0.348 -0.038 0.030 -0.224 0.077 0.825 0.643 0.581 0.313 0.007 
Jan+1 NG 0.804 0.259 0.392 0.252 0.343 0.622 0.643 0.608 0.070 -0.119 
Feb+1 NG 0.790 0.315 0.371 0.280 0.364 0.517 0.566 0.510 -0.105 -0.175 
Mar+1 NG 0.692 0.315 0.455 0.455 0.483 0.399 0.503 0.483 -0.105 -0.217 
Apr NG 0.469 0.650 0.650 0.238 0.483 0.287 0.350 0.231 0.224 0.140 
May NG 0.483 0.378 0.350 0.098 0.294 0.385 0.441 0.364 0.112 -0.035 
June NG 0.601 0.119 0.315 0.294 0.322 0.406 0.503 0.517 0.028 -0.308 
July NG 0.692 0.105 0.217 0.042 0.168 0.657 0.706 0.685 0.105 -0.147 
Aug NG 0.699 0.042 0.070 -0.098 0.049 0.524 0.559 0.531 -0.063 -0.231 
Sep NG 0.587 -0.123 0.049 0.070 0.112 0.399 0.469 0.497 -0.056 -0.399 
Oct NG 0.413 -0.224 0.070 0.189 0.105 0.259 0.315 0.364 -0.042 -0.552 
Nov NG 0.517 -0.126 0.140 0.133 0.105 0.427 0.455 0.483 0.112 -0.420 
Dec NG 0.671 0.007 0.217 0.154 0.168 0.483 0.476 0.469 0.112 -0.350 
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TABLE A.3. Extended 
 Jun Unl July Unl Aug Unl Sep Unl Oct Unl Nov Unl Dec Unl Jan+1 NG Feb+1 NG Mar+1 NG Apr NG 
May Corn 0.139 0.133 0.139 0.238 0.412 0.321 0.348 0.804 0.790 0.692 0.469 
July Corn 0.141 -0.119 -0.082 -0.141 0.065 -0.022 -0.038 0.259 0.315 0.315 0.650 
Sep Corn  -0.024 -0.154 0.112 0.065 0.079 0.053 0.030 0.392 0.371 0.455 0.650 
Dec Corn -0.088 -0.125 -0.123 -0.247 -0.156 -0.201 -0.224 0.252 0.280 0.455 0.238 
Mar+1 Corn -0.135 -0.090 0.129 0.059 0.011 0.046 0.077 0.343 0.364 0.483 0.483 
Jan+1 Unl 0.298 0.465 0.678 0.761 0.779 0.798 0.825 0.622 0.517 0.399 0.287 
Feb+1 Unl 0.222 0.490 0.657 0.593 0.606 0.633 0.643 0.643 0.566 0.503 0.350 
Mar+1 Unl 0.243 0.523 0.686 0.567 0.490 0.548 0.581 0.608 0.510 0.483 0.231 
Apr Unl 0.457 0.300 0.424 0.214 0.364 0.337 0.313 0.070 -0.105 -0.105 0.224 
May Unl 0.773 0.319 0.152 -0.127 0.096 0.018 0.007 -0.119 -0.175 -0.217 0.140 
June Unl 1.000 0.480 0.154 0.040 0.203 0.038 0.090 0.147 0.007 -0.028 -0.224 
July Unl 0.480 1.000 0.721 0.294 0.408 0.457 0.453 0.469 0.350 0.336 -0.126 
Aug Unl 0.154 0.721 1.000 0.666 0.585 0.750 0.765 0.531 0.420 0.371 0.098 
Sep Unl 0.040 0.294 0.666 1.000 0.837 0.891 0.893 0.483 0.287 0.294 -0.028 
Oct Unl 0.203 0.408 0.585 0.837 1.000 0.928 0.816 0.664 0.476 0.462 0.189 
Nov Unl 0.038 0.457 0.750 0.891 0.928 1.000 0.946 0.594 0.462 0.413 0.175 
Dec Unl 0.090 0.453 0.765 0.893 0.816 0.946 1.000 0.497 0.329 0.210 0.000 
Jan+1 NG 0.147 0.469 0.531 0.483 0.664 0.594 0.497 1.000 0.916 0.811 0.531 
Feb+1 NG 0.007 0.350 0.420 0.287 0.476 0.462 0.329 0.916 1.000 0.902 0.643 
Mar+1 NG -0.028 0.336 0.371 0.294 0.462 0.413 0.210 0.811 0.902 1.000 0.636 
Apr NG -0.224 -0.126 0.098 -0.028 0.189 0.175 0.000 0.531 0.643 0.636 1.000 
May NG -0.224 -0.021 0.308 0.147 0.308 0.364 0.189 0.469 0.692 0.671 0.811 
June NG -0.175 0.259 0.483 0.420 0.545 0.524 0.336 0.713 0.797 0.881 0.594 
July NG 0.021 0.490 0.664 0.531 0.685 0.692 0.573 0.867 0.895 0.790 0.566 
Aug NG -0.021 0.469 0.538 0.420 0.573 0.573 0.531 0.811 0.811 0.671 0.503 
Sep NG -0.084 0.448 0.524 0.490 0.587 0.552 0.476 0.664 0.650 0.713 0.357 
Oct NG -0.231 0.294 0.434 0.448 0.559 0.476 0.350 0.650 0.566 0.692 0.273 
Nov NG -0.154 0.308 0.538 0.531 0.671 0.594 0.476 0.769 0.671 0.685 0.371 
Dec NG -0.091 0.266 0.490 0.476 0.636 0.559 0.490 0.867 0.762 0.664 0.434 
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TABLE A.3. Extended 
 May NG June NG July NG Aug NG Sep NG Oct NG Nov NG Dec NG 
May Corn 0.483 0.601 0.692 0.699 0.587 0.413 0.517 0.671 
July Corn 0.378 0.119 0.105 0.042 -0.126 -0.224 -0.126 0.007 
Sep Corn  0.350 0.315 0.217 0.070 0.049 0.070 0.140 0.217 
Dec Corn 0.098 0.294 0.042 -0.098 0.070 0.189 0.133 0.154 
Mar+1 Corn 0.294 0.322 0.168 0.049 0.112 0.105 0.105 0.168 
Jan+1 Unl 0.385 0.406 0.657 0.524 0.399 0.259 0.427 0.483 
Feb+1 Unl 0.441 0.503 0.706 0.559 0.469 0.315 0.455 0.476 
Mar+1 Unl 0.364 0.517 0.685 0.531 0.497 0.364 0.483 0.469 
Apr Unl 0.112 0.028 0.105 -0.063 -0.056 -0.042 0.112 0.112 
May Unl -0.035 -0.308 -0.147 -0.231 -0.399 -0.552 -0.420 -0.350 
June Unl -0.224 -0.175 0.021 -0.021 -0.084 -0.231 -0.154 -0.091 
July Unl -0.021 0.259 0.490 0.469 0.448 0.294 0.308 0.266 
Aug Unl 0.308 0.483 0.664 0.538 0.524 0.434 0.538 0.490 
Sep Unl 0.147 0.420 0.531 0.420 0.490 0.448 0.531 0.476 
Oct Unl 0.308 0.545 0.685 0.573 0.587 0.559 0.671 0.636 
Nov Unl 0.364 0.524 0.692 0.573 0.552 0.476 0.594 0.559 
Dec Unl 0.189 0.336 0.573 0.531 0.476 0.350 0.476 0.490 
Jan+1 NG 0.469 0.713 0.867 0.811 0.664 0.650 0.769 0.867 
Feb+1 NG 0.692 0.797 0.895 0.811 0.650 0.566 0.671 0.762 
Mar+1 NG 0.671 0.881 0.790 0.671 0.713 0.692 0.685 0.664 
Apr NG 0.811 0.594 0.566 0.503 0.357 0.273 0.371 0.434 
May NG 1.000 0.769 0.713 0.601 0.531 0.378 0.476 0.483 
June NG 0.769 1.000 0.874 0.762 0.867 0.832 0.853 0.783 
July NG 0.713 0.874 1.000 0.923 0.811 0.685 0.818 0.853 
Aug NG 0.601 0.762 0.923 1.000 0.860 0.650 0.755 0.825 
Sep NG 0.531 0.867 0.811 0.860 1.000 0.874 0.853 0.790 
Oct NG 0.378 0.832 0.685 0.650 0.874 1.000 0.951 0.839 
Nov NG 0.476 0.853 0.818 0.755 0.853 0.951 1.000 0.951 
Dec NG 0.483 0.783 0.853 0.825 0.790 0.839 0.951 1.000 
Note: The month abbreviation is for the futures contract month, “+ 1” indicates the month is in the next (as opposed to the current) year, “Unl” stands for unleaded 
gasoline, and “NG” stands for natural gas. 
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TABLE A.4. Target rank correlations 
 May Corn July Corn Sep Corn Dec Corn Mar+1 Corn Jan+1 Unl Feb+1 Unl Mar+1 Unl Apr Unl May Unl 
May Corn 1.000 0.580 0.328 0.322 0.334 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 
July Corn 0.580 1.000 0.774 0.597 0.686 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 
Sep Corn  0.328 0.774 1.000 0.820 0.888 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 
Dec Corn 0.322 0.597 0.820 1.000 0.848 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 
Mar+1 Corn 0.334 0.686 0.888 0.848 1.000 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 
Jan+1 Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 1.000 0.659 0.607 0.246 0.298 
Feb+1 Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.659 1.000 0.659 0.195 0.246 
Mar+1 Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.607 0.659 1.000 0.143 0.195 
Apr Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.246 0.195 0.143 1.000 0.659 
May Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.298 0.246 0.195 0.659 1.000 
June Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.349 0.298 0.246 0.607 0.659 
July Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.401 0.349 0.298 0.556 0.607 
Aug Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.452 0.401 0.349 0.504 0.556 
Sep Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.504 0.452 0.401 0.452 0.504 
Oct Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.556 0.504 0.452 0.401 0.452 
Nov Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.607 0.556 0.504 0.349 0.401 
Dec Unl 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.659 0.607 0.556 0.298 0.349 
Jan+1 NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Feb+1 NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Mar+1 NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Apr NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
May NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
June NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
July NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Aug NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Sep NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Oct NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Nov NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Dec NG 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
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TABLE A.4. Extended 
 June Unl July Unl Aug Unl Sep Unl Oct Unl Nov Unl Dec Unl Jan+1 NG Feb+1 NG Mar+1 NG Apr NG
May Corn 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
July Corn 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
Sep Corn  0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
Dec Corn 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
Mar+1 
Corn 
0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
Jan+1 Unl 0.349 0.401 0.452 0.504 0.556 0.607 0.659 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Feb+1 Unl 0.298 0.349 0.401 0.452 0.504 0.556 0.607 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Mar+1 Unl 0.246 0.298 0.349 0.401 0.452 0.504 0.556 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Apr Unl 0.607 0.556 0.504 0.452 0.401 0.349 0.298 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
May Unl 0.659 0.607 0.556 0.504 0.452 0.401 0.349 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
June Unl 1.000 0.659 0.607 0.556 0.504 0.452 0.401 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
July Unl 0.659 1.000 0.659 0.607 0.556 0.504 0.452 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Aug Unl 0.607 0.659 1.000 0.659 0.607 0.556 0.504 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Sep Unl 0.556 0.607 0.659 1.000 0.659 0.607 0.556 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Oct Unl 0.504 0.556 0.607 0.659 1.000 0.659 0.607 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Nov Unl 0.452 0.504 0.556 0.607 0.659 1.000 0.659 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Dec Unl 0.401 0.452 0.504 0.556 0.607 0.659 1.000 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Jan+1 NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 1.000 0.795 0.770 0.601 
Feb+1 NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.795 1.000 0.795 0.577 
Mar+1 NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.770 0.795 1.000 0.553 
Apr NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.601 0.577 0.553 1.000 
May NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.625 0.601 0.577 0.795 
June NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.650 0.625 0.601 0.770 
July NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.674 0.650 0.625 0.746 
Aug NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.698 0.674 0.650 0.722 
Sep NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.722 0.698 0.674 0.698 
Oct NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.746 0.722 0.698 0.674 
Nov NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.770 0.746 0.722 0.650 
Dec NG 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.795 0.770 0.746 0.625 
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TABLE A.4. Extended 
 May NG June NG July NG Aug NG Sep NG Oct NG Nov NG Dec NG 
May Corn 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
July Corn 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
Sep Corn  0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
Dec Corn 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
Mar+1 Corn 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
Jan+1 Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Feb+1 Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Mar+1 Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Apr Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
May Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
June Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
July Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Aug Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Sep Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Oct Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Nov Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Dec Unl 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 
Jan+1 NG 0.625 0.650 0.674 0.698 0.722 0.746 0.770 0.795 
Feb+1 NG 0.601 0.625 0.650 0.674 0.698 0.722 0.746 0.770 
Mar+1 NG 0.577 0.601 0.625 0.650 0.674 0.698 0.722 0.746 
Apr NG 0.795 0.770 0.746 0.722 0.698 0.674 0.650 0.625 
May NG 1.000 0.795 0.770 0.746 0.722 0.698 0.674 0.650 
June NG 0.795 1.000 0.795 0.770 0.746 0.722 0.698 0.674 
July NG 0.770 0.795 1.000 0.795 0.770 0.746 0.722 0.698 
Aug NG 0.746 0.770 0.795 1.000 0.795 0.770 0.746 0.722 
Sep NG 0.722 0.746 0.770 0.795 1.000 0.795 0.770 0.746 
Oct NG 0.698 0.722 0.746 0.770 0.795 1.000 0.795 0.770 
Nov NG 0.674 0.698 0.722 0.746 0.770 0.795 1.000 0.795 
Dec NG 0.650 0.674 0.698 0.722 0.746 0.770 0.795 1.000 
Note: The month abbreviation is for the futures contract month, “+ 1” indicates the month is in the next (as opposed to the current) year, “Unl” stands for unleaded gasoline, and 
“NG” stands for natural gas. 
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